{"id":13728,"date":"2026-11-11T11:01:19","date_gmt":"2026-11-11T06:01:19","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/ksestocks.com\/blog\/?p=13728"},"modified":"2026-11-11T15:06:38","modified_gmt":"2026-11-11T10:06:38","slug":"can-earning-on-debt-be-an-ethical-dilemma-the-origin-and-impact-of-certain-lending-methods","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/ksestocks.com\/blog\/can-earning-on-debt-be-an-ethical-dilemma-the-origin-and-impact-of-certain-lending-methods\/","title":{"rendered":"Can earning on debt be an ethical dilemma? The origin and impact of certain lending methods."},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Debt markets have always played a vital role in channeling useful capital to deserving stakeholders. This has helped many benevolent individuals earn and raise money, as well as many competitive enterprises run efficient and socially beneficial projects. However, when a country or an individual ends up taking debt that it cannot afford it is very easy to fall prey to the burdens of this transaction style. Somehow, this is increasingly becoming the norm in present day markets.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In this article I use a few cases, macro and micro which highlight certain features of debt instruments which if restructured or controlled can make debt less of a burden for the borrowers and for the larger market. These are not necessarily engineering flaws rather ethical questions on proportionality  of costs that arise with debt.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Entitlement to future money which is not guaranteed, fair?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The return on debt tends to cover the opportunity costs incurred by the creditor based on principles of time value. However, if additional profit-making is the only intention to get into a contract initiated on the other’s essential needs it can lead to financial distrust and unfair burden on the borrower.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

 The chaotic birth of bonds:<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The first ever structure in history close to a bond market came into place in Venice in the 12th century. During this era Venice housed wealthy world-class businessmen with a diverse international trade network. The “Republic of Venice” operated independently and refused to pay taxes or to submit to the many orders of the Byzantine Emperor Manuel I. As a result, the emperor ordered forceful arrest of Venetians outside the city’s territory and created many direct and indirect hurdles in their international trade. As the people who somehow managed to flee the Emperor’s atrocious attempts at murder reached the city, a sort of panic was created and people started to pressure the leadership for a solution. After a democratic process of reconciliation with the residents and businessmen of the city at that time, the business head, called the “Doge”, Vitale II Michiel, decided that the wealthy merchants amongst them would lend some money to the government to finance the war. In return they will be paid 5% interest and to make it further agreeable the receipts were made tradeable. These receipts were called Prestiti (Singular: Prestito). This is how bonds started.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Need<\/em>: To wage a war against an empire which is playing with a nation’s trade cycles essentially threatening their long-term survival and taking the lives of current nationals living abroad.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Burden upon: Wealthy businessmen of the city and the government later.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Costs for the government: 5% interest until the war was won.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Capital raised: Enough capital was raised to build 120 warships.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Final outcome: Venice lost the war. Income promised to “investors” was not completely returned nor the principal. The lending community was furious. They chased out the Doge from his final attempt to conduct a negotiation committee and as he ran for his life, the person who led the first bond-market structure in the world against a deadly war, was stabbed to death by angry investors who thought they had been treated unfairly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Question 1: Who is the most evil character of this story after Emperor Manuel 1?<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Question 2: I have heard James Carville being quoted on the brilliance of bond markets: “I used to think that if there was reincarnation, I wanted to come back as the president or the pope or as a .400 baseball hitter. But now I would like to come back as the bond market. You can intimidate everybody.” My question is who intimidates whom and why?<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Who will pay the interest?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Good News: The venetian people later did realize they had treated the Doge unfairly. They executed the killer. And set up a proto-parliament and overcame the mob mentality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Repayment of the debt and interest: They taxed the realto stalls (the stalls selling stuff in the city’s business hub called the realto), some people a bit more than others. And through this managed to pay the 5% interest on the debt that was raised. The principal, however, remained unpaid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Point to be noted<\/strong>: The institution which needed funds was unable to finance the cost of debt without additional income. When that income did not come through winning a war, they had to tax their own businessmen.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Even today most people who require debt do not have the wealth profile to bear the costs. Their repayment is often dependent on additional income. So, for debtors who have taken up heavy debt it takes a lot more time to achieve a higher wealth profile and build their life there on. This time can look like a few months for shorter debt investments while up to 20 or 30 years for longer contracts. And sometimes estimations fail and the debtors default on the very thing they needed to upgrade their status. It could be a car, a house or even mere education to start a job. In the worst case, they come back to square one and other times their progress is delayed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Interest costs are high and most financial structures only amplify them<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The first instance of compounding is said to have started from Benjamin Franklin\u2019s will to the tradesmen of Boston and Philadelphia. This involved a principal of \u00a31000 to both cities which was to be lent for 200 years. In the first century all interest earned would be consistently reinvested. In the second century some could be spent on public works while the rest was to operate similarly. In 1990, after 200 years, Boston\u2019s fund was worth more than \u00a33 million while Philadelphia\u2019s fund was worth more than \u00a31.5 million. This means an interest rate of around 4% compounded annually over a 200-year period. If it was 4% simple interest every year both funds would have been well under \u00a310 thousand in 200 years. This is remembered as a marvelous arrangement because, well, it was. Most of the funds were used for objectives of education, scholarships or other civic projects.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, many loans today are required by working class borrowers for essential purposes. And interest is not paid by tradesmen getting to grow their business through the funds received.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Compounding in consumer credit:<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Some lending schedules charge higher interest than others because of the way they are structured. Consider a loan of $100 thousand to be paid over 2 years with monthly payments on 7% annual interest. Below are two common schedules in consumer finance. One is equal amortizing while the other is equal payment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Equal Amortizing\/ Equal Principal format:<\/h4>\n\n\n\n

In this format the principal is repaid in fixed installments while interest is paid on the principal residual every period.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Equal Amortizing\/ Equal Principal: 100,000 over 24 months<\/strong><\/td><\/tr>
 <\/td> <\/td>7.00%<\/em><\/td>0.58%<\/em><\/td><\/tr>
 <\/td>Principal<\/td>Interest<\/td>Balance<\/td><\/tr>
0<\/td> <\/td> <\/td>                               100,000<\/td><\/tr>
1<\/td>                     4,167<\/td>            583<\/td>                                  95,833<\/td><\/tr>
2<\/td>                     4,167<\/td>            559<\/td>                                  91,667<\/td><\/tr>
3<\/td>                     4,167<\/td>            535<\/td>                                  87,500<\/td><\/tr>
4<\/td>                     4,167<\/td>            510<\/td>                                  83,333<\/td><\/tr>
5<\/td>                     4,167<\/td>            486<\/td>                                  79,167<\/td><\/tr>
6<\/td>                     4,167<\/td>            462<\/td>                                  75,000<\/td><\/tr>
7<\/td>                     4,167<\/td>            438<\/td>                                  70,833<\/td><\/tr>
8<\/td>                     4,167<\/td>            413<\/td>                                  66,667<\/td><\/tr>
9<\/td>                     4,167<\/td>            389<\/td>                                  62,500<\/td><\/tr>
10<\/td>                     4,167<\/td>            365<\/td>                                  58,333<\/td><\/tr>
11<\/td>                     4,167<\/td>            340<\/td>                                  54,167<\/td><\/tr>
12<\/td>                     4,167<\/td>            316<\/td>                                  50,000<\/td><\/tr>
13<\/td>                     4,167<\/td>            292<\/td>                                  45,833<\/td><\/tr>
14<\/td>                     4,167<\/td>            267<\/td>                                  41,667<\/td><\/tr>
15<\/td>                     4,167<\/td>            243<\/td>                                  37,500<\/td><\/tr>
16<\/td>                     4,167<\/td>            219<\/td>                                  33,333<\/td><\/tr>
17<\/td>                     4,167<\/td>            194<\/td>                                  29,167<\/td><\/tr>
18<\/td>                     4,167<\/td>            170<\/td>                                  25,000<\/td><\/tr>
19<\/td>                     4,167<\/td>            146<\/td>                                  20,833<\/td><\/tr>
20<\/td>                     4,167<\/td>            122<\/td>                                  16,667<\/td><\/tr>
21<\/td>                     4,167<\/td>               97<\/td>                                  12,500<\/td><\/tr>
22<\/td>                     4,167<\/td>               73<\/td>                                    8,333<\/td><\/tr>
23<\/td>                     4,167<\/td>               49<\/td>                                    4,167<\/td><\/tr>
24<\/td>                     4,167<\/td>               24<\/td>                                          (0)<\/td><\/tr>
 <\/td>                100,000<\/td>         7,292<\/td> <\/td><\/tr>
    Summarized as:<\/strong><\/td><\/td><\/td>     <\/td><\/tr>
<\/td>Rate summary<\/td>Monthly<\/td>Annual<\/td><\/tr>
<\/td>Simple rate<\/td>0.58%<\/em><\/td>7.00%<\/em><\/td><\/tr>
<\/td>Compound rate<\/td>0.59%<\/em><\/td>7.06%<\/em><\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Equal Payment\/ Blended Payment format:<\/h4>\n\n\n\n

In this format a fixed payment is made in each period within which principal gradually decreases while interest increases over time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Equal Payment\/ Blended Payments: 100000 over 24 months<\/strong><\/td><\/tr>
 <\/td> <\/td> <\/td>7.00%<\/em><\/td>0.58%<\/em><\/td><\/tr>
 <\/td>PMT<\/td>Principal<\/td>Interest<\/td>Balance<\/td><\/tr>
0<\/td> <\/td> <\/td> <\/td>         100,000<\/td><\/tr>
1<\/td>         4,477<\/td>                     3,894<\/td>             583<\/td>           96,106<\/td><\/tr>
2<\/td>         4,477<\/td>                     3,917<\/td>             561<\/td>           92,189<\/td><\/tr>
3<\/td>         4,477<\/td>                     3,939<\/td>             538<\/td>           88,250<\/td><\/tr>
4<\/td>         4,477<\/td>                     3,962<\/td>             515<\/td>           84,287<\/td><\/tr>
5<\/td>         4,477<\/td>                     3,986<\/td>             492<\/td>           80,302<\/td><\/tr>
6<\/td>         4,477<\/td>                     4,009<\/td>             468<\/td>           76,293<\/td><\/tr>
7<\/td>         4,477<\/td>                     4,032<\/td>             445<\/td>           72,261<\/td><\/tr>
8<\/td>         4,477<\/td>                     4,056<\/td>             422<\/td>           68,205<\/td><\/tr>
9<\/td>         4,477<\/td>                     4,079<\/td>             398<\/td>           64,126<\/td><\/tr>
10<\/td>         4,477<\/td>                     4,103<\/td>             374<\/td>           60,023<\/td><\/tr>
11<\/td>         4,477<\/td>                     4,127<\/td>             350<\/td>           55,895<\/td><\/tr>
12<\/td>         4,477<\/td>                     4,151<\/td>             326<\/td>           51,744<\/td><\/tr>
13<\/td>         4,477<\/td>                     4,175<\/td>             302<\/td>           47,569<\/td><\/tr>
14<\/td>         4,477<\/td>                     4,200<\/td>             277<\/td>           43,369<\/td><\/tr>
15<\/td>         4,477<\/td>                     4,224<\/td>             253<\/td>           39,145<\/td><\/tr>
16<\/td>         4,477<\/td>                     4,249<\/td>             228<\/td>           34,896<\/td><\/tr>
17<\/td>         4,477<\/td>                     4,274<\/td>             204<\/td>           30,622<\/td><\/tr>
18<\/td>         4,477<\/td>                     4,299<\/td>             179<\/td>           26,324<\/td><\/tr>
19<\/td>         4,477<\/td>                     4,324<\/td>             154<\/td>           22,000<\/td><\/tr>
20<\/td>         4,477<\/td>                     4,349<\/td>             128<\/td>           17,651<\/td><\/tr>
21<\/td>         4,477<\/td>                     4,374<\/td>             103<\/td>           13,277<\/td><\/tr>
22<\/td>         4,477<\/td>                     4,400<\/td>               77<\/td>             8,877<\/td><\/tr>
23<\/td>         4,477<\/td>                     4,425<\/td>               52<\/td>             4,451<\/td><\/tr>
24<\/td>         4,477<\/td>                     4,451<\/td>               26<\/td>                      0<\/td><\/tr>
 <\/td> <\/td>                100,000<\/td>         7,454<\/td> <\/td><\/tr>
    Summarized as:<\/td><\/td><\/td> <\/td><\/td><\/tr>
<\/td><\/td>Rate summary<\/td>Monthly<\/td>Annual<\/td><\/tr>
<\/td><\/td>Simple rate<\/td>0.58%<\/em><\/td>7.00%<\/em><\/td><\/tr>
<\/td><\/td>Compound rate<\/td>0.60%<\/em><\/td>7.21%<\/em><\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

The equal payment amount is calculated through the formula:<\/p>\n\n\n

\n
\"\"<\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n

This formula is derived from a series which assumes each interest incurrence on previous interest+principal payment. The series looks like this:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

P1<\/sub> = P0<\/sub> \u2013 M + P0<\/sub>r = P0<\/sub>(1+r) \u2013 M<\/p>\n\n\n\n

P2<\/sub> = P1<\/sub> \u2013 M + P1<\/sub>r = P1<\/sub>(1+r) \u2013 M<\/p>\n\n\n\n

P3<\/sub> = P2<\/sub> \u2013 M + P2<\/sub>r = P2<\/sub>(1+r) \u2013 M<\/p>\n\n\n\n

P4<\/sub> = P3<\/sub> \u2013 M + P3<\/sub>r = P3<\/sub>(1+r) \u2013 M<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026..<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Pn<\/sub> = Pn<\/sub> \u2013 M + Pn<\/sub>r = Pn<\/sub>(1+r) \u2013 M<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As the formula suggests when the frequency of payments, interest rate or loan amount increases so does the difference of compounding over simple interest. This leads to higher total interest in the second format of repayment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

US Student Debt: The 2025 Default Cliff and multiple forbearance schemes later:<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The slippery slope to 2025 default cliff:<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

About 30% of adults took a loan for some level of education in the US and student debt makes 5-7% of US GDP. However, there have been repetitive default issues since 2020. Even if we omit the 2023 period of peak covid turbulence the trend and subsequent actions by government suggest the same.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    \n
  1. From March 2020 to September 2023 many federal loans were granted interest-free forbearance. This means during that window of time the borrowers were not required to pay interest payments neither would they accrue on the balance they owed and were required to pay after the forbearance window ended.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  2. Subsequently the ED (Enforcement Directorate) started the year-long “On ramp to repayment” policy during which people were expected to make monthly payments but people who went delinquent for 90 days were put in the “Retroactive administrative forbearance”. This policy remained in action until Sep 2024 and those who could still not pay their debt afterwards were labeled delinquent.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  3. In June 2025, loans of around 5.3 million recipients ($117 bn in value) were in default. Many of these debtors defaulted prior to the Covid-19 payment pause.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  4. Also in June 2025, the loans of around 4.3 million recipients ($103 bn in value) which are delinquent are in the range of 181-270 days being delinquent. This time line corresponds with the roughly 1-year period since after the “On ramp to repayment” program which ended in Sep 24. Due to these numbers as held by the ED, a default cliff was forecasted in the fall of 2025.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n
    \n
    \"\"<\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n

    Putting things into perspective: In 2025 out of the 43 million people who owed a combined 1.6 trn in fed student loans about 35 million were supposed to be in repayment. The total of 9.6 mn in default since pre-covid plus long delinquent since 2024, as we discussed above make 27% of the 35 million in 2025.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    About 27% of people in repayment either since pre-covid or since 2024 became delinquent by the end of 2025.<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

    As per the report of “Economic Well-being of US Households\u201d released in May 2026 around 23% of such debtors had recent payment difficulty out of which three quarters said it was due to a reason related to affordability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Multiple Adjustments and Forbearances under OBBBA (One Big Beautiful Bill Act):<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

    Let’s have an idea of the forbearances expected as per the new repayment plan options given by OBBBA and also highlight the huge delay the fed is willing to give to ensure the interest payments it wants from current debtors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    For loans originating after 1 Jul, 2026 all debtors will be given two options for repayment:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      \n
    1. The first “tiered standard plan” requires fixed monthly payments for 10, 15, 20 and 25 years based on the borrower’s total loan balance. Previously this period used to be a 10-year period and can now go up to 25 years.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    2. The RAP (Repayment Assistance Plan) on the other hand will target borrowers based on their earning capability. The rate of their monthly payments will be dependent on which slab their Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) falls in as under:<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    3. 1% of AGI between $10,000 and $20,000<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    4. 2% of AGI between $20,000 and $30,000<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    5. Continues to add 1% for each additional $10,000 in the slab<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    6. A max of 10% for incomes greater than $100,000<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    7. Each borrower, even the very low-income borrowers must pay $10 per month.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n

      Forbearance:<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
        \n
      • If required payments are less than interest accrued unpaid interest is automatically waived.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
      • A person placed in RAP will have $600 annual reduction in required payments for each dependent child.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
      • The first $50 of a scheduled payment goes towards reducing the loans principal even if the payment does not cover the accrued interest. In short timely payments (following the rules of the RAP amount) lead to a declining loan balance due to multiple subsidies over time.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n

        While the above adjustments provide solutions to a solid crisis they also highlight the rising issue of debtors\u2019 declining ability to repay their loans on time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        The borrowing side makes market majority; their default deters national prosperity<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

        The Supply Demand Imbalance in the Debt Market:<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

        Many debt transactions constitute a resource imbalance which when it spreads into the economy tightens spending and reduces steady capital resources. When an increased level of debt is utilized by majority participants in the market for a consistently long time it increases debt servicing costs and reinforces the problematic cycle of debt.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        An interesting summary from Apollo Academy visualises the above cycle for the US from 2020 onwards.<\/p>\n\n\n

        \n
        \"\"<\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n

        The figure above points out that while the increase in gross issuance of treasuries was gradual in 20 years between 2001 and 2020 by a 3-month sum of $3 trilllion, it was much more rapid and larger in 6 years between 2020 and 2026 by a 3-month sum value of $5 trillion. A significant portion of these issues are treasury bills.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        While supply has increased significantly it is clearly not the case with demand. The bid-to-cover ratios are seeing a downward trend. Also, foreign investors\u2019 confidence has largely shifted to gold.<\/p>\n\n\n

        \n
        \"\"<\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n
        \n
        \"\"<\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n

         <\/h2>\n\n\n\n

        As the cycle goes: Higher debt levels = higher debt servicing costs<\/h2>\n\n\n
        \n
        \"\"<\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n

        As the figure above shows while before 2020 the US government was paying $500 to 700 billion in debt servicing costs, the level is much higher since after 2020, rapidly reaching $1.2 trillion in 2026.<\/p>\n\n\n

        \n
        \"\"<\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n

        The above graphs highlight how interest expense is making an increasing proportion of national expenses. While per-day interest expense from 2006 to 2020 only changed by $0.5 billion, between 2020 to 2026 the change has been of a $2 billion. This shows how significantly increasing debt levels are pulling up debt-related costs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        In conclusion, we need to recognize the fact that students who cannot afford to pay for college themselves or the many families who pay high costs for 20 to 30 years before they can call a house their own make the majority. Given the recent rise in default scenarios and borrowing expenses, thoughtful innovation and cost redistribution is needed to keep this structure from collapsing. Especially, when a major chunk of population is dependent on the lending market for essential needs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

        Debt markets have always played a vital role in channeling useful capital to deserving stakeholders. This has helped many benevolent individuals earn and raise money, as well as many competitive enterprises run efficient and socially beneficial projects. However, when a country or an individual ends up taking debt that it cannot afford it is very […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":9259,"featured_media":9737,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[153,2],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-13728","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-economy","category-psx-blog"],"featured_image_src":{"landsacpe":["https:\/\/ksestocks.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/Top-X-Stocks7-1140x445.jpg",1140,445,true],"list":["https:\/\/ksestocks.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/Top-X-Stocks7-463x348.jpg",463,348,true],"medium":["https:\/\/ksestocks.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/Top-X-Stocks7-300x188.jpg",300,188,true],"full":["https:\/\/ksestocks.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/Top-X-Stocks7.jpg",1920,1200,false]},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/ksestocks.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13728","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/ksestocks.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/ksestocks.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ksestocks.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/9259"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ksestocks.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=13728"}],"version-history":[{"count":6,"href":"https:\/\/ksestocks.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13728\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":13742,"href":"https:\/\/ksestocks.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13728\/revisions\/13742"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ksestocks.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/9737"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/ksestocks.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=13728"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ksestocks.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=13728"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ksestocks.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=13728"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}